In grading some papers last night, I came across the sentiments of one student who preferred Kant's deontological ethical system over Aristotle's virture ethic. This is not surprising. Kant has the advantage of promoting the use of reason independent of circumstance and inclination, as well as promoting both human autonomy and universality. Not that Aristotle's is an irrational, relativistic system. Hardly. But whereas Kant's ethical test is the categorical imperative, and applicable to all settings, Aristotle's test of virtue is the mean, and is often difficult to discern in the midst of ever-changing circumstances. Whether one looks at moral behavior through the lenses of duty, or pursues it through the virtues one sees exemplified in the person of serious moral stature, both conceptions understand an action to have moral worth when done on the basis of duty or of virtue alone. Still, Kant's might be the more rational, as seen through Enlightenment eyes, but Aristotle's just might be the more realistic.
Both Kant and Aristotle had the advantage of describing their ethical constructs from within a single cultural setting. Kant's Enlightenment Prussia and Aristotle's classical Athens form the backdrop against which their ethical systems are set in relief. In a U. S. society that is ever more pluralistic and ever less monochromatic, the elevation of a Mediterranean social structure and mores as something like a model for ethical reflection seems unduly chauvanistic. On the other hand, the universalization of ethics in an Enlightenment mode seems unduly inconsiderate of the particular perspectives from which various social groups approach the problems of moral behavior. One might ask, "Whose culture, which rationality are we to follow?"
Of course, within U. S. society, the ethical paradigm tends either to be a much-degraded Epicureanism (that is to say, little more than hedonism, the indiscriminate pursuit of pleasure), or a utilitarianism brought to its ultimate, dehumanizing conclusion (which is to say, the greatest good for the greatest number of persons who can pay for it).
This rather pessimistic appraisal of the ethics of U. S. society admittedly fails to take into account that many people do indeed live lives of moral worth, whether theirs be a more articulate ethical system along the lines of Kant or Aristotle, or whether it be much more simplistic, perhaps even unreflective, and something like a bastardized form of the Golden Rule (or a more "gentle" form of lex talionis).
As a Christian, however, I cannot endorse Kantian, Aristotelian, utilitarian, or some other ethical system; at least not wholly. Though any of these may provide helpful insights with regard to human activity, still my convictions cannot but include a paradigm in which the Incarnation and Resurrection form integral pillars; the implications of which mean both that human existential reality includes both freedom of will and an obedience in which we are conformed to the Trinitarian image of God.
This means, in other words, that my ethical paradigm must conform to the reality of the Body of Christ. My existential reality is at its core a realized if proleptic hypostatic unity with God, which can only be accomplished in Christ and therefore in His Body, the Church. This ethical activity, on my part, is known and experienced as working out my salvation with fear and trembling. But it is also known and experienced as God working in me both to will and do according to His good pleasure.
That this can be systematized in terms of concepts and connections, I have no doubt. But it will never be able to approximate the Kantian model in that for Kant, though the rational concepts of God, freedom and immortality are regulative ideals (in that they are rationally necessary either in terms of pure reason or its flip side practical reason), they cannot be proven, or known from experience. With Aristotle, I recognize a particular community and a moral exemplar from which my understanding of the range of moral behavior in a particular set of circumstances arises. However, this community, the Church, encompasses many human cultures; and so is transcultural. Further, our moral exemplar is not merely persons of serious moral stature, as we might describe the saints, but rather is the God-man Himself, Jesus of Nazareth, who takes all our human activity and unites it to the energies of God, thus "relativizing" ethical norms, without doing away with their authority. We are to both honor our fathers and mothers, the first of the Ten Words with a promise; yet if we do not hate father and mother we are not worthy to be the disciples of Christ.
Regrettably, we don't see enough of this sort of ethical behavior in the various Christian groups here in the U. S. Rather the unreflective persons most often approximate something of a consumerist Epicureanism, or Mills' utilitarianism. The more reflective relativize Aristotle or take on the mere ratinoality of Kant. In the end, most seek the Baal of voting to achieve their ethical norm.
Perhaps the various Christian communities here in the U. S. will some day recapture a more Christian ethical paradigm and cease the practice of coming to ethical norms through the lenses of partisan politics and of juridical expediency. While it is right and appropriate for the Christian Body to discuss ethical problems, it does not seem to me Christian to form voting blocs to achieve one's agenda. Then again, if one subscribes to human behaviors that the Word of God written and the Church have prescribed for thousands of years, I suppose that one has little other recourse than to resort to the machinations of Robert's Rules of Order. But this is hardly the ethical norm of Christian consensus.
Posted by Clifton at July 17, 2003 09:30 PM | TrackBack