Kevin claims, in his reply "Vicious Interpretive Circles," that I've apparently been arguing with another Kevin and not him. This is just his nice way of saying I've been arguing the straw man. This would be a most embarrasing state of affairs, let me tell you. Vicious interpretive circles, indeed!
I say "would be" because I have to say, looking over Kevin's objections, it's not clear to me that I actually have set up another argument than his only to knock it down and leave his still standing. If I have put words in Kevin's mouth, they are only the implications of his own argument, or the necessary conclusions which he refuses to accept.
But that being said, let's take a look at the objections, and let's once again, as clearly as can be stated, identify the impasses.
Kevin first addresses my contention that he objects to icons because the Scripture does not explicitly command their veneration. No, he says, that's not at all why he objects to their veneration. Rather, it's because, he claims, they violate the Second Commandment. I hope Kevin will forgive the oversight on my part. When Kevin first mentions icons he does so in this way:
In affirming the sufficiency of Scripture, I am not denying the necessity of such secondary standards as creeds or confessions, or of preaching. In each case, however, these are examples of tradition justified from Scripture properly exegeted ( and where they are not, such as Nicea II, we are required to ignore them).
What does one get from this? That icons cannot be justified from the proper exegesis of Scripture, and on that basis, must be rejected. And through our discussion, Kevin nowhere makes it apparent that his objection is based on anything other than his own rejection of what he takes to be the improper biblical exegesis of Scripture by the Tradition. Consider, for example, the most explicit comments he makes on the matter:
Concerning icons- they're probably a lot older than the eighth century. As to your evidence of iconography in first century practice, please produce it. I would like something more substantial than the fact that the catacombs had pictures. Nevertheless, I must acknowledge that the practice came from somewhere. A likely source may be found in various Gentile converts who imported their cultural idol worship into the church. Moreover, I have a particularly hard time accepting iconography. Even if I did agree to the validity of extra-Biblical tradition, I could not see my way to making icons a part of it. Considering the predominance of Jews in the early church coupled with the post-exilic Jewish aversion to anything that even smelled like an idol, I would have expected historical evidence (preferably Scriptural) that this issue had been addressed to the satisfaction of the Jews. I have read some early material on the subject, it may have even been John of Damascus. As I recall, the argument was two-fold. One part appeared to the Platonic chain of being; the other argued that the incarnation had changed the terms whereby the Second Commandement, the one prohibiting graven images, was to be understood. While I believe this to be enough, technically, to take iconography out of the category of extra-Biblical tradition, it strikes me more as rationalization of a prior belief using Scripture rather than an example of sound exegesis. In light of such a specific prohibition, I want more than an argument that the incarnation may allow for iconography; I want the incarnation to require iconography.
Once again, his objection to icons is not said to be based explicitly on the Second Commandment, but on the fact that he doesn't buy St. John Damascene's exegesis of the Second Commandment. I don't see how I've misconstrued his actual words. But to the degree that he has clarified himself, I welcome his clarification.
I would also take the time to point out that what separates us is precisely the hermeneutic applied to the Scriptures. Kevin himself admits that the justification of icons, in part, on the basis of Scriptural exegesis takes icons out of the realm of extra-biblical tradition. So it's no longer a case of Scripture and Tradition in opposition, so much as it is a matter of hermeneutics. Kevin interprets the Scriptures differently from the historic Church. (Hint of foreshadowing: This will become a refrain.)
Kevin next objects to my characterization of his views of Scripture and its teaching on the Trinity. He writes:
Clifton puts more words in my mouth concerning the doctrine of the Trinity. I said, "Scripture clearly teaches it." I did not say that the inference from the Scriptures is "clear and unequivocal." This adds a connotation and spin to my position that I never intended. It makes it sound as though I believe that any individual with a Bible could just come to the correct and well formulated conclusion.
I'm not sure how "unequivocal" adds a "connotation and spin" to his position. After all, if something is clear, we should be able to get the message right? We would not be in doubt as to its intended meaning or meanings. There would be no equivocating on our part as to what the Scripture actually says. Still, Kevin thinks I'm conveying something in his words that he does not intend, so let his objection stand.
But I should note that Kevin does admit, or rather, strongly implies, that individuals will misinterpret the Scripture, even if its message is clear. Again: What separates us? A difference of interpretation.
Infallibility
Kevin next objects to what I have done with his exegesis of the passages formerly under consideration. Given that we are specifically dealing with biblical passages, it's fairly obvious that in all these disagreements, one of the things that will separate Kevin and me is hermeneutics. But, too, he claims I have mischaracterized his words and arguments, making up this other Kevin that is not him, so we need to address these matters.
For Matthew 18, he objects that I have taken the term "Scripture" in his exegesis of the passage and construed it to mean the canon of the Old and New Testaments. Here I hope Kevin will once again forgive my error. But I'm afraid that his objection is a bit surprising to me. After all, for Kevin, all the Apostolic Tradition is inscripturated, which means that even what Christ said to his Apostles in Matthew 18, even though it was not, when Christ was speaking, yet Scripture, necessarily would become so. I'm often at a loss here, for Kevin apparently means by Scripture both what actually is Scripture and what will also become Scripture. But if it will become Scripture, then doesn't it mean it isn't yet Scripture?
In any case, as it turns out, Kevin has a different exegesis of Matthew 18:
Still, the passage is not teaching that whatever the Church decides, without qualification, will automatically be in concert with the revelation of God. It is saying that when these decisions are in concert with the revelation of God, then they will reflect what is true in heaven. Something needs to be done with the phrase "in my name." The immediate context is of no help in defining the nature of the church. If it is true that the church is infallible, then the phrase functions as a description: the true church always acts in the name of Christ. If it is not true that the church is infallible, then the phrase functions as a qualifier: the church will be correct in its decisions only insofar as it has acted in the name of Christ. In short, the text itself does not address the issue of infallibility. Notions for or against must be imported into it.
Kevin's careful distinctions between descriptions and qualifiers, between "the true church always acts in the name of Christ" and "the church will be correct in its decisions only insofar as it has acted in the name of Christ" don't help his case at all. They do in fact, contrary to his assertion, "define the nature of the Church." More to the point, this is not only not a defeasor to infallilibilty, but only serves to strengthen the case that the true Church is, indeed, infallible. Kevin does not think so, of course, because Kevin does not think any such Church exists.
Kevin next objects to my limiting his understanding of what is taught and preached, in his exegesis of Ephesians 4, to the Scriptures. He claims that my objection is to the other Kevin. But let's put the Kevin's back-to-back with Kevin. Here's his original exegetical conclusion:
Paul's admonition to Timothy, the pastor at Ephesus, was, "Preach the word; be ready in season and out of season; reprove, rebuke, and exhort, with complete patience and teaching" (II Timothy 2:2). Just prior to this, Paul had identified the Scripture as being sufficient unto these things, "All Scripture is breathed out by God and profitiable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteosness, that the man of God may be competent, equipped for every good work" (3:16,17). Back in Ephesians 4, these officers are given as gifts to the Church in order that they might "equip the saints for the work of the ministry" (v.12). They are to "attain to the unity of the faith" (v.13) and not be "carried about by every wind of doctrine" (v.14). The pastor accomplishes this through the faithful preaching of the Word. The result is that the Church, "speaking the truth in love" (v.15) will grow into maturity in Christ. And so the prayer of Christ is answered, "Sanctify them in the truth; your word is truth" (John 17:17). Scripture, considered in the abstract as a collection of propositions, has no power. But this has nothing to do with sola scriptura. Scripture preached and lived is another matter altogether. "For the word of God is living and active, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the division of soul and spirit, of joints and of marrow, and discerning the thoughts and intentions of the heart" (Hebrews 4:12).
And here's his most recent conclusion:
Speaking the truth in love is not possible apart from those ministries whereby the Word is preached and taught. But it goes beyond this. It defines a life and a practice of love. It is informed by the content of Scripture, but not limited thereto (which would constitute a caricature of sola scriptura). In building one another up, the members of the church must also think in terms of those unique lives and circumstances that surround them. We interpret the comtemporary in accordance with the preaching of the Word. Now to his [i. e., mine] mantra that any mention or implication of Scripture must be limited to the OT. In II Peter 3:15, 16, Peter mentions Paul's letters and compares them to the "other Scriptures." That is, there were some NT letters that had already been recognized as Scripture. I believe that more can be inferred from this, but I'll leave it at a minimum. "Scripture" is used in Scipture to refer to more than OT Scripture. Furthermore, there is a difference between direct reference and implication. When Paul says in II Timothy 3:16 that "All Scripture is breathed out by God," the direct reference can only be to whatever had been written at the time. However, by implication it must include all Scripture that was to be written thereafter. Either that or anything from a later date is less important. There is no textual reason for me to limit "Scripture" or "Word" to the OT when Scripture itself does not do this.
And here's my original critique of his first set of exegetical comments:
Now he goes to great lengths, pulling in some passages from 2 Timothy, to show that this "Word" is nothing more nor less than the Scriptures. Once again, however, his eisegesis is manifest, for Paul could not have meant the Scriptures that we have today (Old and New Testaments), but could only have meant the Old Testament. Thus, if Kevin wants to import these extratextual meanings into the context of Ephesians, he is going to have to limit himself to only the body of the Old Testament writings. It's clear, however, that he does not want to do this but wants to anachronistically read "Protestant 66" into every instance of the word "Scriptures" or "Word" in the passages under consideration.
Maybe it's not so much that I am arguing with a different Kevin as that Kevin has a split personality.
Next, his objection that I took as part of his argument against my interpretation of 1 Timothy 3:15 something he only meant in jest is, embarrassingly, a valid one. On reflection, it is clear he meant the talk about noun genders as a jest, but I missed all the connections. More the worse for me. However, the remainder of my critique he acknowledges and lets stand my understanding of his exegesis. But what does he say about 1 Timothy 3:15?
The passage is not teaching that the Church stands alone in this regard. The truth is also anchored in the guidance of the Holy Spirit and in the infallible Word. There is no need for the Church to be infallible when it is in such company.
Here Kevin commits the logical fallacy of the false dilemma. He did it originally, too:
Assuming the presence of both the Holy Spirit and of Scripture (or, at the time, that tradtion which had yet to be inscripturated), there is no need to postulate infallibility for the Church in order for it to function in this regard.
In other words, for Kevin, either you have the Holy Spirit and the infallible Scripture or you have an infallible Church. If you have the first two (Spirit and Scripture) you don't need the second. But he never actually argues how it is that the Holy Spirit and an infallible Scripture are incompatible with an infallible Church. We're just told the latter is not necessary. This, however, is just simply gainsaying. It's not an argument. And since Kevin must invent a false dilemma to reach his interpretation he has not actually explained the passage as explained it away.
Kevin's objection to my characterization of his exegesis of John 16:13 is that my summation of his position is "close" but "significantly different." What is his summation of his position?
I take this text as referring to the receiving of tradition (which I believe is eventually inscripturated, thus the necessity of an infallible element). The process of which I spoke was in reference to the Church's interpretation of Scripture. One may attempt to argue that the distinction is not valid, but there is no contradiction.
But what did I actually say of Kevin's position?
If Kevin wants to argue that this progressivist interpretation was indeed fulfilled in the completion of the Scriptures, then it necessarily follows that the promise of the leading of the Holy Spirit into all truth is no longer in effect. . . . But if Kevin does indeed tie the promise of the Holy Spirit's leading to both the completion of the canon and the proper interpretation of it, he once again begs the question as to how to determine between interpretations.
So, apparently, I did have Kevin's (or both Kevins') argument right.
Let's look at Kevin's exegesis and see if it substantiates his argument.
As I've reflected further on the passage, it's grammar and it's meaning, I'm inclined to agree with Kevin's judgment that the verb for "to lead" here (hodegesei) is, indeed, a future indicative. In my original argument this grammatical point did not feature prominently (after all, I indicated it was ambiguous), and indeed, as I see on reflection, the weight of my argument lent itself more to the grammatical force of hodegesei as a future indicative. In point of fact, there is no dichotomy necessary between the future indicative voice in this subjunctive clause and the state of fulfillment and ongoing effect of the fulfillment. Given the indefinite temporal clause, in fact, one of the perfect indicatives could not be used, and the future indicative can function nicely in that role, though nothing of the future indicative necessitates a perfective understanding. That is to say, the future indicative does not necessitate the progressivist position I was arguing against, and, indeed, works better with my own position.
Be that as it may, the bulk of the argument centered on the audience and scope of the promise. What does Kevin assert about these things?
Now, I would say that the promise made in John 16:13 was not made to the Eleven as such, but as they represented the foundational offices of the church, which include both apostles and prophets. It extends to more than the Eleven, but it does not need to extend to the whole church. This promise concerns their role as the church's foundation. It is about the receiving and future inscripturation of tradition. While the Spirit does lead in other capacities, this verse does not address these and cannot be set in opposition to those passages that do.The promise in John 16:13 applies to the formation of tradition, not to its subsequent interpretation. It need not be applied to anything beyond the foundational offices. I will agree that, in context, the truth refers to Jesus. But, just as we can go back to 14:6, we can also jump forward to 17:17 where the word is truth. John himself ties the two concepts together at the opening of his gospel, "In the beginning was the Word." There is a double referent. The Spirit will lead into the truth, which is Christ, who is fully revealed in the canons of Scripture. This verse was fulfilled in the completion of the Scriptures. But it does not follow that the Holy Spirit no longer leads into truth in other capacities. This would only be the case if this were the only passage from which such an activity could be inferred. Yet, even Clifton notes other passages that imply the leading of the Spirit as it relates to truth. But these were in reference to the members of the church. A verse about leading the foundation of the church into truth as it relates to the formation of tradition should not be confused with verses in which the members are led into truth as it relates to the interpretation of tradition.
In other words, the promise to lead the Apostles into all truth only means the completion of the biblical canon. But Kevin knows that the Holy Spirit has to illumine the understanding of the members of the Church as they read "all the truth" in the Scriptures, so he concedes my point that "leading into all truth" does actually involve more than inscripturation. He, however, without any warrant, asserts that the promise only applies to inscripturation. And then goes on to make another unwarranted distinction between the individual members of the Church and the Church as a whole. If the Holy Spirit can lead individual members into all truth, I see no reason to think He cannot do so with the entire Body. Kevin does, however. Though he gives no argument for why this must be the case. He merely asserts it.
Hermeneutics
Where the, at present, irresoluble matters come to a head, however, is in the final matter under consideration: hermeneutics. Kevin affirms that an infallible Scripture will always be interpreted by fallible interpreters. There's no help for it, really, so he says,
the people must study Scripture to see whether what was preached is so; the pastors must be under constant review of their peers; local churches must submit to larger bodies; confessions and creeds should be maintained. Authority does not imply that the one in authority is always right. Many disagreements between those in authority and those being led need to be resolved by submission. Nevertheless, it is also the case the Holy Spirit illumines the minds of individuals. We all stand under a dual authority: that of God and that of men and, forced into a decision, we ought always to obey God.
Ah, and there's the rub. What, really, is the voice of God in this scenario? Our interpretation of the Scriptures. That is to say, "God" here is always and only our interpretation of what we think is God. In other words, put baldly, we either obey the interpretations of others, or we obey our own interpretations. Kevin admits this, in fact:
Clifton states that the only way that I can know that some people are teaching heresy is because they do not agree with my interpretation. As stated, this is both true and painfully obvious. Knowledge is not possible unless it is filtered through individual interpretation. This is how we were created.
What Kevin fails to address is why anyone should take his views over mine, or his views over the historic Church's understanding?
Witness the disagreement over the Matthean, Johannine and Pauline texts above. I read the texts to affirm the Church's quality of infallibility. From that infallibility I then argue an authority to offer binding interpretation. I have demonstrated how my interpretation of these Scriptural texts is better and more consistent than Kevin's (which depends in every case on unwarranted eisegesis, or importation into the texts meanings they do not have). Kevin, of course, disagrees that his case is eisegesis but is, in his terminology, "Scripture properly exegeted."
Kevin argues that in these cases of irresoluble disagreement, we'll have to submit either to our leaders or to God. But why should we trust those in authority over us more than we do our own leading? Kevin can give no answer. How do we know when our leaders are usurping God's will? Again, all we can go on is our own leading. But whether we can ever know that our leading is indeed God's will he does not say.
Now Kevin pooh-pooh's this notion of actually knowing that one's interpretation is, indeed, true, by constructing a regressus ad infinitum of my assertion of the infalliblity of the Church.
Clifton asserts that only an infallible interpretor can settle disputes between intepretive options. There is a problem with this. The infallible interpretor is outside of the individual. Once it states its infallible interpretation, the relationship between this interpretation and the individual is the same as that which existed between the individual and the thing interpreted. The interpretation now needs to be interpreted. Add as large a regress of interpretation as you will, at some point, the individual will have to interpret what he has heard. And unless this final individual interpretation is also infallible, it begs the question of why a particular link in the interpretive chain had to be infallible. Whether my beliefs run contrary to what any other part of the church has ever said or whether, to the best of my ability, I follow the creeds and councils, it is, in the end, my interpretation that has decided the matter. Clifton is no different. He has chosen to follow Orthodoxy because, by his interpretation, it is the true religion. By his interpretation, infallibility is necessary. For each article of faith and practice in the Orthodox church, he chooses to agree with it because, by his interpretation, it is correct. Or if, failing to understand an article, he submits anyway, then, by his interpretation, this was the correct thing to do. In short, Clifton has not escaped the viscious interpretive circle either. He believes and practices all that he does because it agrees with his interpretation. The interpretive device that asks, "What does it mean to me?" such that objective truth is irrelevant, is, at all times, to be avoided. On the other hand, meaning is meaningless unless it means something to me.
Of course, Kevin's assertion that the Church's infallible interpretation must itself be interpreted, leading to infinite regress, is a red herring. It is a red herring because it is precisely the problem with his own account, so to point the finger and call "Thou art the man!" is simply to direct attention away from one's own self. It is also a red herring because the infallibility of the Church is not predicated upon the need for settling interpretive disputes, but is predicated upon the nature of what the Chuch is and the promises made by our Lord to the Church. It is finally a red herring because the operative function of infalliblity is not clarity of interpretation but of authority. Only an infallible authority can say, "This is the mind of Christ." But in point of fact, the Church has not settled every interpretive dispute, but has let stand the lack of clarity as to what is, for example, the meaning of the number of the beast in the Apocalypse, or what exactly was Paul's thorn in the flesh. Her infallibility, rather, is directed to the salvation of our souls. Where authoritative interpretations may be considered necessary for that, then the Church can, on the basis of her infallibility, make known the mind of Christ. Witness, for example, the infalliblity promised in Matthew 18. The whole point is to win back one's brother.
The trouble, however, is that Kevin's own infinite regress circles back on him. He need merely only replace the infallible Church with his own fallible self, or the fallible church leaders to whose authority we must submit when there is disagreement . . . er, unless our interpretation is such that we presume ourselves to be disobeying God by submitting to our leaders.
All of which to say is that Kevin offers no better alternative, and, despite his best efforts, has only come round to my own argument, except that he ultimately subsitutes himself as the fallible, but finally authoritative, interpreter.
And, in the end, when we come right down to it, does Kevin reject my interpretations of these biblical passages on demonstrable, reasonable, logical grounds? I have shown he does not. No, in the end, he rejects them for his subjectivist presuppositions. He has stated it baldly:
[T]he only way that I can know that some people are teaching heresy is because they do not agree with my interpretation. As stated, this is both true and painfully obvious. Knowledge is not possible unless it is filtered through individual interpretation. This is how we were created.
I leave you with Kevin, the fallible but ultimately and finally authoritative interpreter.
Conclusion
As it turns out, I haven't been arguing the straw man after all, but have substantively captured Kevin's argument and refuted it. That he doesn't like what I do with his argument is evident. But all he has done thus far is gainsay me. That is why I have quoted much more extensively from Kevin in this reply than previously, and also why I have been careful to show that my summations of his argument are both accurate and substantive.
As I noted in my formerly penultimate reply, we have reached an impasse. Regrettably, Kevin's response (linked in the first sentence of this post) to my formerly penultimate reply has done nothing to advance the argument any further. For the record we stand where we first did: Kevin arguing that (true) Tradition is nothing more than the propositional and inferential content of Scripture, and me arguing that Scripture is part of Tradition, the same in essence but different in material. We have clarified our positions, and examined each other's arguments. But we can go no further, unless Kevin wants to offer a whole new set of arguments. For myself, I am quite content with my own.
Kevin will doubtless disagree vociferously that I have substantively refuted his argument or that he needs to offer a new argument. He has certainly given me no reason to think that I should offer anything new myself. So here we sit, deadlocked.
But I trust this exercise has been useful to our readers, and if any of them have been moved to further interest in the substance of my argument, or, as I fervently hope, have been moved to accept my argument, I will have been repaid more than I deserve.
May the Lord bless us all, and pray for me, a sinner.
Posted by Clifton at March 2, 2005 04:00 PM | TrackBack